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In this talk we present item pricing algorithms and mechanisms for revenue
maximization in combinatorial auctions. We start by considering the unlimited-
supply combinatorial auction setting and present a simple algorithm [1] which
achieves an O(k) approximation for the case of single-minded bidders who each
want at most k items, improving on the O(k2) bound of Briest and Krysta [3].
We then show that in unlimited-supply combinatorial auctions, randomly choos-
ing a single price to offer for every item achieves expected revenue within a log-
arithmic factor of the total social welfare for bidders with general valuation func-
tions [2]. Guruswami et. al [6] had showed this only for the special cases of single-
minded and unit-demand bidders. Moreover, our result does not even require val-
uations to be monotone (“free disposal”). This gives the first general logarithmic
approximation known for item pricings in unlimited supply combinatorial auctions.
We finally consider the limited supply setting (a single copy of each item is
available), for which much less is known in terms of revenue maximization. We
show here that a random single price achieves a 2O(
√
logn log logn) approximation
for the class of subadditive bidders. This improves over the best previous revenue
guarantee for computationally efficient mechanisms, which was anO(
√
n) approx-
imation [5], and furthermore our result applies even to the online case in which
bidders arrive and purchase what they like in an arbitrary order. We complement
this result with a lower bound showing a sequence of subadditive (in fact, XOS)
bidders for which any single price has approximation ratio Ω(2log
² n) for some
² > 0. The lower bound demonstrates a distinction between revenue maximization
and social welfare maximization, for which [5, 4] show that a fixed price achieves a
logarithmic approximation in the case of XOS [5], and more generally subadditive
[4], bidders.
This talk is based in large part on work in [1] and [2], joint with Avrim Blum
and Yishay Mansour.
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